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when compelled to speak 37 and the voice heard at the time the rape was
-committed should not be excluded as a violation of the privilege against
self incrimination. It should be admitted as a fact calculated to aid the
jury in discovering the truth, the correctness of the identification going
to the weight and not the admissibility of the evidence.
38
LERoY F. FULLER.
Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practices-Employer By-passing
Designated Bargaining Agent
An employer, after having bargained to an impasse with the certified
representative of the employees, submitted his final proposal directly to
strikers individually by mail, requesting them to vote on a ballot pro-
vided as to whether they would be willing to return to work upon the
terms proposed by the employer but rejected by the union. The National
Labor Relations Board found' that the employer interfered with the
rights of the employees to bargain collectively within the meaning of
Section 8(a) (1)2 of the National Labor Relations Act. Upon petition
to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for enforcement
of the order, it was held that the evidence did not justify a finding of
an unfair labor practice because: (1) the letter disclosed no effort to
bargain with the employees individually; (2) the employer had evi-
denced his good faith in dealing with the union; and (3) the employer
" No power of compulsion beyond that ordinarily permitted in obtaining testi-
mony should be allowed. The powers of compelling testimony are discussed in 8
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §2195 (3d ed. 1940). If the accused refuses to repeat the
words, testimony as to this refusal would be competent. State v. Graham, 74
N. C. 646 (1876).
" The question of admissibility of voice identification on grounds other than
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination is beyond the scope of this
mnote. Proper safeguards should be taken to prevent inducement or suggestion
of the identification. The accused should be presented in company with others
who are similar in appearance. This procedure was followed in the instant case.
-3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§786, 786a (1946). In general such identification is ad-
missible, its probative value to be a question for the jury. Riner v. State, 128
Fla. 848, 176 So. 38 (1937); Fussell v. State, 93 Ga. 450, 21 S. E. 97 (1895);
-Commonwealth v. Wifiliams, 105 Mass. 67 (1870); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §660
(3d ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVImENcE, §96 (1946).
' Penokee Veneer Co., 74 N. L. R. B. 1683 (1947).
249 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), as amended by National
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1) (Supp.
1947): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 7." Sec. 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self organization,
- to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section
_ 8(a) (3)."
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had never been charged with failure to bargain collectively nor any
previous unfair conduct.
3
Section 14 of the Act provides that it is the policy of the United
States to remove recognized sources of industrial strife by establishing
equality of bargaining power and encouraging collective bargaining be-
tween employers and employees. Fundamental to the whole structure
of collective bargaining are the exclusive bargaining rights5 granted to
the proper representative of the employees. The duty of the employer
to bargain collectively with the union designated by the employees in-
cludes the negative duty to refrain from bargaining with any other group
or individual.8
Fact situations of a wide variety have arisen before the National
Labor Relations Board which present the question of whether or not
it is an unfair labor practice for the employer to disregard or by-pass
the union designated by the employees as their bargaining represent-
ative. The Board has consistently held that it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer to by-pass the designated representative of the
employees by dealing directly with them individually7 or by unilaterally
determining conditions of employment.8 Similarly, unfair labor prac-
'National Labor Relations Board v. Penokee Veneer Co., 168 F. 2d 868
(C. C. A. 7th 1948).'49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §151 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. -,
29 U. S. C. §151 (Supp. 1947).
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(5)
(1946), as amended, 61 STAT. - , 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (5) (Supp. 1947) : "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain col-
lectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
Section 9(a)." Sec. 9(a) provides, "Representatives designated or selected for
the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. . . ." See
generally: Weyand, Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COL. L. REv. 556
(1945).
8 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S. 678,
683-684 (1943) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., 301
U. S. 1, 44 (1936); 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 328
(1940).
See, e.g., Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 73 N. L. R. B. 1339 (1947); Twin
City Milk Producers Ass'n, 61 N. L. R. B. 69 (1945) ; Arundel Corp., 59 N. L.
R. B. 505 (1944) ; Burke Machine Tool Co., 36 N. L. R. B. 1329 (1941), enforce-
ment granted (mior modifications), 133 F. 2d 618 (C. C. A. 6th 1942) ; Highland
Shoe, Inc., 23 N. L. R. B. 259 (1940), enforcement granted, 119 F. 2d 218 (C. C.
A. Ist 1941) ; Pacific Gas Radiator Co., 21 N. L. R. B. 630 (1940) ; Stout, Charles
Banks, 15 N. L. R. B. 541 (1939); Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.," 12 N. L. R. B. 944
(1939), enforcement granted (minor modifications), 118 F. 2d 874 (C. C. A. 1st
1941); Williams Coal Co., 11 N. L. R. B. 579 (1939); Hopwood Retinning Co.,
4 N. L. R. B. 922 (1938), enforcement granted (as modified), 98 F. 2d 97 (C. C.
A. 2d 1938); Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 679 (1937), enforcement
granted, 98 F. 2d 18 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; 4 NLRB ANN. REP. 137 (1939).
8 See, e.g., Hartz Stores, 71 N. L. R. B. 848 (1946): May Dep't. Stores Co..
53 N. L. R. B. 1366 (1943), enforcement granted, 146 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A. 8th
1944), aff'd, 326 U. S. 376 (1945); Hirsch Mercantile Co., 45 N. L. R. B. 377
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tices have been found when an employer urges striking employees to
return to work under the employer's terms regardless of the decision
of their chosen bargaining representative, or when an employer con-
ducts a poll among the employees to determine their wishes about
returning to work.10
A review of the cases in the circuit courts of appeals reveals a
divergence of opinion. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals set
aside the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice where the em-
ployer conducted his own strike vote subsequent to a strike resolution
of the union,"- but approved a finding of an unfair labor practice when
an employer went over the head of the union and submitted an employ-
ment contract to a mass meeting of employees. 12 In National Labor
Relations Board v. Remington Rand13 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a finding of an unfair labor practice where an employer
conducted a strike vote of his own, disregarding the strike vote con-
ducted by the union. The Board's finding of an unfair labor practice
was rejected by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals where the employer
had polled the employees, rather than bargain with their representative,
with reference to holiday and overtime work.' 4 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals conceded that it was unfair for an employer to effect a wage
cut unilaterally' 5 but reached an opposite result when the employer
unilaterally increased- wages.'
0
(1942); Wilcox Oil & Gas Co., 28 N. L. R. B. 79 (1940); Southern Cotton Oil
Co., 26 N .L. R. B. 177 (1940) ; Brown Shoe Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 803 (1936). But
cf. May Dep't. Stores Co., 53 N. L. R. B. 976 (1943).
'See, e.g., National Container Corp., 57 N. L. R. B. 565 (1944); Chicago
Molded Products Corp., 38 N. L. R. B. 1111 (1942); Montgomery Ward & Co.,
37 N. L. R. B. 100 (1941), enforcement granted, 133 F. 2d 676 (C. C. A. 9th
1942); Martin Bros. Box Co., 35 N. L. R. B. 217 (1941), enforcement granted,
130 F. 2d 202 (C. C. A. 7th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 660 (1942); Atlas
Mills, 3 N. L. R. B. 10 (1937). But cf. Gulf States Utilities Co., 42 N. L. R. B.
988 (1942).
1" Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 46 N. L. R. B. 714 (1943), enforcement granted
(as mnodified), 147 F. 2d 262 (C. C. A. 6th 1945); Biles-Coleman Lumber Co., 4
N. L. R. B. 679 (1937), enforcement granted, 98 F. 2d 18 (C. C. A. 9th 1938) ;
accord, Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 26 N. L. R. B. 975 (1940), enforcentent
denied, 121 F. 2d 602 (C. C. A. 7th 1941). But cf. Fafnir Bearing Co., 73 N. L.
R. B. 1008 (1947) (strike called in violation of contract).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F.
2d 602 (C. C. A. 7th 1941) (strike resolution illegal).
12 National Labor Relations Board v. Martin Bros. Box Co., 130 F. 2d 202
(C. C. A. 7th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S: 660 (1942) ; accord, National Labor
Relations Board v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F. 2d 676 (C. C. A. 9th 1943).
94 F. 2d 862 (C. C. A. 2d 1938), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 576, 585 (1938);
accord, National Labor Relations Board v. New Era Die Co., 118 F. 2d 500
(C. C. A. 3d 1941).
"4 National Labor Relations Board v. Brown-Brockmeyer Co., 143 F. 2d 537
(C. C. A. 6th 1944).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F. 2d 474 (C. C.
A. 5th 1940) ; accord, Great Southern Trucking Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 127 F. 2d 180 (C. C. A. 4th 1942); National Labor Relations Board v
Pilling & Son Co., 119 F. 2d 32 (C. C. A. 3d 1941).
" National Labor Relations Board v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 167 F
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The United States Supreme Court faced the question in two cases.
In Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,17 at
the request of the employees, the employer negotiated with them and
granted a wage increase without the intervention of the union. In May
Department Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board's the em-
ployer unilaterally applied to the War Labor Board for approval of a
wage increase. In both cases the Court held that the National Labor
Relations Board was justified in finding unfair labor practices in spite
of the extenuative circumstances that the Medo case employees in effect
requested the employer to by-pass the union, and the May case employ-
er's unilateral action consisted of a mere preliminary step toward a wage
adjustment. Thus the Supreme Court has given strong support to the
proposition that it is unfair for the employer to by-pass the designated
employee representatives either by dealing with employees directly or
by unilateral action.
The findings of unfair labor practices in these cases are not always
based on the same provision of the Act. The conduct of the employer
in by-passing the union has been treated as evidence of bad faith in
bargaining and therefore a failure to bargain as required in Section
8(a) (5), 19 and an interference with the rights of the employees which
are protected by the general terms of Section 8(a) (1).20
Though a viblation of 8(a) (5) is technically a violation of 8(a) (1)
also,21 it is not necessary to find a violation of 8(a) (5) in order to find
2d 662 (C. C. A. 5th 1948), cert. granted, 69 Sup. Ct. 52 (1948). Contra:
National Labor Relations Board v. May Dep't. Stores Co., 146 F. 2d 66 (C. C. A.
8th 1944), aff'd, 326 U. S. 376 (1945).
:7 321 U. S. 678, 684-685 (1943) ("That it is a violation of the essential prin-
ciple of collective bargaining and an infringement of the Act for the employer
to disregard the bargaining representative by negotiating with individual em-
ployees . . . with respect to wages, hours and working conditions was recognized
by this court .... The statute guarantees to all employees the right to bargain
collectively through their chosen representative. Bargaining carried on by the
employer directly with the employees . . . who have not revoked their designation
of a bargaining agent, would be subversive of the mode of collective bargaining
which the statute has ordained, as the Board, the expert body in this field, has
found. Such conduct is therefore an interference with the rights guaranteed by
§7 and a violation of §8(1) of the Act.").
18 326 U. S. 376, 384 (1945) (citing the Medo case, the Court said, "Employer
action to bring about changes in wage scales without consultation and negotiation
with the certified representative of its employees cannot, we think, logically or
realistically, be distinguished from bargaining with individuals or minorities.").
"o See note 5 supra; Great Southern Trucking Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 127 F. 2d 180 (C. C. A. 4th 1942); National Labor Relations Board v.
Pilling & Son Co., 119 F. 2d 32 (C. C. A. 3d 1941); Weyand, supra note 5, at
579-580.
" May Dep't. Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 326 U. S. 376
385 (1945); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321
U. S. 678, 684 (1943) ("Such conduct is therefore an interference with the rights
guaranteed by §7 and a violation of §8(1) of the Act.") ; National Labor Relations
Board v. Whittier Mills Co., 111 F. 2d 474 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) (conduct may
constitute failure to bargain, interference, or both).
2Arts Metal Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 110 F. 2d
19491
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a violation of 8(a) (1).22 Thus it appears that by-passing the designated
representative of the employees, if not a refusal to bargain, may con-
stitute interference, though the possibility seems to be overlooked on
occasion.
2 3
The instant case is open to criticism on two principle grounds :24
1. The reasons given by the court to support its conclusion that
the employer committed no unfair labor practice in conducting the poll
among the employees may constitute a valid argument that the employer
had not refused to bargain with the designated union within the mean-
ing of §8(a) (5). However, the reasoning does not support a conclusion
that the employer had not interfered with rights of the employees pro-
tected by §8(a) (1),2 5 the only unfair labor practice charged against
the employer in this case.
2. On the merits, it is difficult to conceive of any employer conduct
which could more effectively interfere with the rights of the employees
to bargain collectively through the representative of their own choosing.
Though the mere act of conducting a poll among strikers to determine
their wishes about returning to work may appear to be innocent on the
surface, a consideration of the effect of such conduct brings out a dif-
ferent picture. By contacting each employee individually, the employer
subjects them to the same pressures which the Act was intended to
eliminate and "minimizes the influence of organized bargaining.120 An
148 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) ; Note, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 360, 362 ("The committee
reports indicate that the unfair labor practices set forth in subsections (2), (3),
(4), and (5) of section 8, are not intended to limit the guaranties of subsection
(1) of that section, but are merely intended to set out with greater particularity
some of the unfair labor practices requiring such amplification. SEN. RE'. No.
573, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., at 9; H. R. Rat'. No. 1147, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., at
17."). But cf. National Labor Relations Board v. Express Publishing Co., 312
U. S. 426 (1941).
22 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U. S.
678, 684 (1943) (quoted supra note 20. By implication).
23 It is believed that National Labor Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co., 121 F. 2d 602 (C. C. A. 7th 1941) is in this category. See note 24
infra.
2" The instant case is also to be criticized for drawing its own inferences from
the evidence, in disregard of the well established rule that inferences are to be
drawn by the Board and not the courts. National Labor Relations Board v.
Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261 (1938). In 2 TELLER, LABOR
DISPUTES AND COLLECrIVE BARGAINING §396 n. 50 (Supp. 1947) it is suggested
that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in particular continues to place itself
in the position of the Board by "looking to the general picture disclosed by the
facts upon which the Board predicated its decision and order, and passing on the
petition ... in the light of this general picture."
2 The same error in reasoning was committed by the same court in National
Labor Relations Board v. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co., 121 F. 2d 602, 608
(C. C. A. 7th 1941), relied upon in the principal case. There the employer's con-
duct in holding his own strike vote was said to be a "proper and necessary busi-
ness expedient." Assuming that this justifies a refusal or failure to bargain, does
it necessarily follow that there has been no interference with the employees' right
to bargain collectively through their representative?
2" May Dep't. Stores Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 326 U. S. 376,
385 (1945).
[Vol. 27
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immediate consequence would be to discredit the union in the eyes of
the employees by demonstrating that the union does not effectively repre-
sent them.27 The ultimate consequence may be the complete destruction
of the actual bargaining capacity of the representative.28
LIvINGSTON VERNON.
Libel-Theories of Liablity-Publication as Single
or Multiple Tort
At common law it was uniformly held that each time a libelous
article was brought to the attention of a third person a new publication
had occurred and each publication gave rise to a separate cause of
action.' This is still the law in many jurisdictions2 and is the view
adopted by the Restatement of Torts,8 but the weight of modern author-
ity favors the "single publication" rule of liability.4  This rule contem-
plates that, whereas each publication does give rise to a separate cause
of action, in the case of newspapers, magazines and books there is but
one publication which occurs at the place where the alleged libel is pub-
lished 5 and is completed when the libelous matter has been composed,
printed and generally distributed.
6
" National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. 2d 862, 870
(C. C. A. 2d 1938).28 Ibid.
IODGERs, LIBEL AND SLANDER 139 (6th ed. 1929); see Age-Herald Pub. Co. v.
Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 43, 92 So. 193, 196 (1921).2 E.g., Hartmann v. American News Co., 69 F. Supp. 736 (W. D. Wis. 1947);
Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E. D. Wash. 1943), app. dis-
missed, 144 F. 2d 249 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; Lockey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
26 Tenn. App. 564, 174 S. W. 2d 575 (1943); Underwood v. Smith, 93 Tenn.
687, 27 S. W. 1008 (1894) ; Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 138 Tex. 434, 160 S. W.
2d 246 (1942) ; Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, 14 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75
(1849).
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §578(b) (1938).
'Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (C. C. A. 3d 1948); Polchlopek v.
American News Co., 73 F. Supp. 309 (D. Mass. 1947); McGlue v. Weekly Pub-
lications, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Backus v. Look, 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y.
1939) ; Means v. MacFadden Publications, 25 F. Supp. 993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ;
Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921); Winrod v.
Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708 (1948); Forman v. Mississippi Pub-
lisher's Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. 2d 344 (1943) ; Gregoire v. G. P. Putnam's
Sons, 298 N. Y. 119, 81 N. E. 2d 45 (1948), reversing, 272 App. Div. 591, 74
N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1st Dep't 1947); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App.
Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 640 (4th Dep't 1938), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 716, 18 N. E. 2d
676 (1939), rearg. denied, 280 N. Y. 572, 20 N. E. 2d 21 (1939); see Julian v.
Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 71, 107 S. W. 496, 500 (1907); cf. Murray v.
Galbraith, 86 Ark. 50, 109 S. W. 1011 (1908).
Contra: Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907).
Compare Age-Herald Pub. Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921)
with Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., supra.
' General distribution to newsstands and subscribers is all that is required. The
mailing out of miscellaneous copies to replace those lost or damaged, or in response
to requests for the purchase of single copies is a part of the original publication
and does not constitute a republication such as will amount to an additional tort
